

BI Policy:

The horns of a trilemma

Samuel Theophilus Artha
Economist/Analyst

Barra Kukul Mamia
Head of Macroeconomic Research

16 January 2025


Executive Summary

- BI unexpectedly cut its policy rate to 5.75% due to concerns over weak growth prospects even amidst worsening sentiment in the global market.
- Lower real rates can improve private liquidity and demand, albeit at the cost of a wider current account deficit and weaker Rupiah.
- BI will need to navigate between the risk of either disinflationary or depreciation spiral, meaning that it would take a tactical approach to its monetary policy.
- Increased minimum repatriation period on export proceeds from 3 months to 12 months can help bolster BI's ammunition against uncontrolled depreciation.
- Improved domestic liquidity and BI's secondary market purchase should reduce SBN yield volatility, crucial given high interest burden and increased bond vigilantism globally.

- BI unexpectedly cut its policy rate to 5.75% in its first meeting of 2025, citing concerns over weak growth prospects. This defied the consensus of all analysts which had expected caution from BI amid recent global uncertainty, and especially given BI's stance in Q4-24—when it refrained from following up its September rate cut largely to maintain Rupiah stability.
- Indeed, one could argue that the global situation has only become more hostile for the Rupiah compared to December when BI chose to hold. The market is now pricing in merely one cut for 2025 instead of two, while questions about Trump policies are becoming more acute the closer we get to his inauguration day.
- The change in BI's policy orientation is even clearer given its vague statements on "keeping Rupiah close to fundamental values". Previously, BI often clearly stated its belief that the Rupiah is undervalued, even going so far as to quoting a specific target price. It would not be a mistake, then, for the market to think that BI is now prepared to accept a slightly weaker exchange rate.
- BI's "January surprise" underscored the trilemma that we outlined in our [2025 Outlook](#). In short, given limited liquidity, policymakers can only choose two out of three between robust fiscal spending, robust private spending, and Rupiah stability. For most of 2024, the policies taken had essentially sacrificed private spending in favor of the other two goals, as liquidity was absorbed to SBN and SRBI while high real rates (vis-à-vis inflation) gradually depress consumer borrowing.
- Lower real rates should improve private liquidity, although of course, monetary policy works with long and variable lags. The flip side, of course, is that increased private spending—amid high fiscal spending—will add to our saving-investment (S-I) gap, i.e. our current account deficit. This, in turn, predicts a weaker Rupiah, in line with our forecast for 2025.


- In shifting its priorities, however, BI has to make sure it does not prevent one “vicious spiral” only to fall into another. The one that BI is trying to avoid could be called a “disinflationary spiral”, whereby weak consumption and falling inflation reduces businesses’ margins, thereby driving down business spending and recruitment, and so on. We have seen recently how the decline in our formal manufacturing sector has driven a decline in lower-middle class incomes, which reduced revenue for SMEs and made larger companies reluctant to spend (preferring to hold cash-like assets).
- Despite its costs, a controlled depreciation may help undercut the disinflationary spiral in a few ways by (1) re-routing demand away from imports and towards local goods; (2) making our exports more competitive; and (3) inflating the money supply, especially from commodity exports and FDI, in Rupiah terms.
- Nevertheless, an attempt at controlled depreciation could turn chaotic (“depreciation spiral”) and backfire if it causes a shift in expectations. Investors, expecting their Rupiah assets to always lose their value, suddenly expects higher premiums—while households seek refuge in gold, crypto, or FX assets. BI, then, will have to expertly steer the ship between Scylla and Charybdis.
- For this reason, we do not expect this latest decision to be part of a continuous rate cut cycle, but instead a tactical choice made on a month-to-month basis. BI also has plenty of room to intervene in the FX market, with its record-high reserves level further buttressed by a new regulation extending the period resource exporters are mandated to keep their FX revenue in domestic banks from three months to twelve. The latter, however, needs to be coupled with stricter enforcement, as a comparison between our resource exports and actual TD-DHE data still shows relatively low compliance.
- Fiscal spending—the third corner of our trilemma—remains the biggest X-factor. For now, we expect a wide fiscal deficit (around 2.8-2.9% of GDP) after the recent VAT hike cancellation, perhaps in addition to negative S-I gap among SOEs and other government-linked institutions. BI is supporting this spending, through debt switching (IDR 100 Tn) and higher SBN buying, which is crucial given the amount of maturing SBN (IDR 757 Tn) in 2025.
- The purchase of SBN should have a positive effect on private liquidity, as it will reduce the amount needed to be absorbed by banks, households, and corporates. Nonetheless, BI will have to strengthen its communication on this matter, given recent attention by the foreign business press on its high level of SBN ownership (25.3%, net). With bond vigilantism on the rise globally, Indonesia can ill-afford a spike in yields, especially with interest on government debt already expected to eat up 2.27% of the GDP.

Panel 1. Declining SRBI outstanding is coupled with an unexpected rate cut this month




Source: BI, Bloomberg, BCA Economist

Panel 2. Indo's long term yield curve goes up in-line with global conditions




Source: MoF, BI, Bloomberg, BCA Economist

Panel 3. Drawdown in savings at 2nd half of 2024 constrained loan growth



Source: MoF, Bloomberg, BCA Economist

Panel 4. Narrowing real rate differentials may weaken Rupiah further



Source: BI, Bloomberg, BCA Economist

Selected Macroeconomic Indicators

Key Policy Rates	Rate (%)	Last Change	Real Rate (%)	Trade & Commodities	15-Jan	-1 mth	Chg (%)
US	4.50	Dec-24	1.60	Baltic Dry Index	1,063.0	1,051.0	1.1
UK	4.75	Nov-24	2.25	S&P GSCI Index	581.8	546.3	6.5
EU	3.15	Dec-24	0.75	Oil (Brent, \$/bbl)	82.0	74.5	10.1
Japan	0.25	Jul-24	-3.00	Coal (\$/MT)	117.2	133.5	-12.2
China (lending)	2.00	Sep-24	4.25	Gas (\$/MMBtu)	4.32	3.14	37.6
Korea	3.00	Nov-24	1.10	Gold (\$/oz.)	2,696.3	2,648.2	1.8
India	6.50	Feb-23	1.28	Copper (\$/MT)	9,053.4	8,940.5	1.3
Indonesia	5.75	Jan-25	4.18	Nickel (\$/MT)	15,629.1	15,633.4	-0.0
				CPO (\$/MT)	1,029.4	1,157.5	-11.1
				Rubber (\$/kg)	1.98	2.02	-2.0
Money Mkt Rates	15-Jan	-1 mth	Chg (bps)	External Sector	Dec	Nov	Chg (%)
SPN (1Y)	6.85	6.88	-2.3	Export (\$ bn)	23.46	24.00	-2.24
SUN (10Y)	7.25	7.00	24.5	Import (\$ bn)	21.22	19.63	8.10
INDONIA (O/N, Rp)	5.99	5.92	6.8	Trade bal. (\$ bn)	2.24	4.37	-48.73
JIBOR 1M (Rp)	6.62	6.63	-0.4	Central bank reserves (\$ bn)*	155.7	150.2	3.65
Bank Rates (Rp)	Oct	Sep	Chg (bps)	Prompt Indicators	Dec	Nov	Oct
Lending (WC)	8.72	8.87	-15.48	Consumer confidence index (CCI)	127.7	125.9	121.1
Deposit 1M	4.78	4.81	-2.76	Car sales (%YoY)	-6.4	-11.9	-3.9
Savings	0.66	0.67	-0.14	Motorcycle sales (%YoY)	-5.5	-10.3	5.4
Currency/USD	15-Jan	-1 mth	Chg (%)	Manufacturing PMI	Dec	Nov	Chg (bps)
UK Pound	0.817	0.792	-2.99	USA	49.4	49.7	-30
Euro	0.972	0.952	-2.02	Eurozone	45.1	45.2	-10
Japanese Yen	156.5	153.7	-1.80	Japan	49.6	49.0	60
Chinese RMB	7.332	7.274	-0.80	China	50.5	51.5	-100
Indonesia Rupiah	16,320	15,995	-1.99	Korea	49.0	50.6	-160
				Indonesia	51.2	49.6	160
Capital Mkt	15-Jan	-1 mth	Chg (%)				
JCI	7,079.6	7,324.8	-3.35				
DJIA	43,221.6	43,828.1	-1.38				
FTSE	8,301.1	8,300.3	0.01				
Nikkei 225	38,444.6	39,470.4	-2.60				
Hang Seng	19,286.1	19,971.2	-3.43				
Foreign portfolio ownership (Rp Tn)	Dec	Nov	Chg (Rp Tn)				
Stock	3,521.3	3,402.4	118.98				
Govt. Bond	876.6	872.5	4.15				
Corp. Bond	5.9	7.1	-1.18				

Source: Bloomberg, BI, BPS

Notes:

*Data from earlier period

For changes in currency: **Black indicates appreciation against USD, **Red** otherwise

***For PMI, **>50** indicates economic expansion, **<50** otherwise



Scan for the link to our report depository or click:

https://s.id/BCA_REI

Indonesia – Economic Indicators Projection

	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024E	2025E
Real GDP growth (% YoY)	5.0	-2.1	3.7	5.3	5.0	5.0	4.9
Nominal GDP growth (% YoY)	6.7	-2.5	9.9	15.4	6.7	7.0	7.9
GDP per capita (USD)	4175	3912	4350	4784	4920	4975	5005
CPI inflation (% YoY)	2.7	1.7	1.9	5.5	2.6	1.6#	2.3
BI Rate (%)	5.00	3.75	3.50	5.50	6.00	6.00#	5.50
SBN 10Y yield (%)	7.04	5.86	6.36	6.92	6.45	6.97#	7.47
USD/IDR exchange rate (end of year)	13,866	14,050	14,262	15,568	15,397	16,102#	16,887
Trade balance (USD Bn)	-3.2	21.7	35.3	54.5	37.0	31.0#	26.2
Current account balance (% of GDP)	-2.7	-0.4	0.3	1.0	-0.1	-0.6	-0.9

Notes:

- USD/IDR exchange rate projections are for fundamental values; market values may diverge significantly at any moment in time
- Numbers marked with (#) for 2024 are final; other numbers for 2024 are our projections

Economic, Banking & Industry Research Team

David E. Sumual

Chief Economist

david_sumual@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1051352

Victor George Petrus Matindas

Senior Economist

victor_matindas@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1058408

Keely Julia Hasim

Economist / Analyst

keely_hasim@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1071535

Nicholas Husni

Economist / Analyst

nicholas_husni@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1079839

Agus Salim Hardjodino

Head of Industry and Regional Research

agus_lim@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1005314

Gabriella Yolivia

Industry Analyst

gabriella_yolivia@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1063933

Elbert Timothy Lasiman

Economist / Analyst

Elbert_lasiman@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1007431

Samuel Theophilus Artha

Economist / Analyst

samuel_artha@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1080373

Barra Kukuh Mamia

Head of Macroeconomic Research

barra_mamia@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1053819

Lazuardin Thariq Hamzah

Economist / Analyst

lazuardin_hamzah@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1071724

Thierris Nora Kusuma

Economist / Analyst

thierris_kusuma@bca.co.id

+6221 2358 8000 Ext: 1071930

PT Bank Central Asia Tbk

Economic, Banking & Industry Research of BCA Group

20th Grand Indonesia, Menara BCA

Jl. M.H Thamrin No. 1, Jakarta 10310, Indonesia

Ph : (62-21) 2358-8000 Fax : (62-21) 2358-8343

DISCLAIMER

This report is for information only, and is not intended as an offer or solicitation with respect to the purchase or sale of a security. We deem that the information contained in this report has been taken from sources which we deem reliable. However, we do not guarantee their accuracy, and any such information may be incomplete or condensed. None of PT. Bank Central Asia Tbk, and/or its affiliated companies and/or their respective employees and/or agents makes any representation or warranty (express or implied) or accepts any responsibility or liability as to, or in relation to, the accuracy or completeness of the information and opinions contained in this report or as to any information contained in this report or any other such information or opinions remaining unchanged after the issue thereof. The Company, or any of its related companies or any individuals connected with the group accepts no liability for any direct, special, indirect, consequential, incidental damages or any other loss or damages of any kind arising from any use of the information herein (including any error, omission or misstatement herein, negligent or otherwise) or further communication thereof, even if the Company or any other person has been advised of the possibility thereof. Opinion expressed is the analysts' current personal views as of the date appearing on this material only, and subject to change without notice. It is intended for the use by recipient only and may not be reproduced or copied/photocopied or duplicated or made available in any form, by any means, or redist ted to others without written permission of PT Bank Central Asia Tbk.

All opinions and estimates included in this report are based on certain assumptions. Actual results may differ materially. In considering any investments you should make your own independent assessment and seek your own professional financial and legal advice. For further information please contact: (62-21) 2358 8000, Ext: 1020451 or fax to: (62-21) 2358 8343 or email: eri.tristanto@bca.co.id